We investigate the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games. The main result of the paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the sufficient conditions for a pair of continuous function to provide a Nash equilibrium. This result generalizes the method of system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
Introduction
In this paper we characterize Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games. We consider nonzero-sum differential games in the framework of positional strategies first suggested by N.N. Krasovskii for zero-sum differential games [1] . The existence of Nash equilibrium was established in works of A.F. Kononenko [2] and A.F. Kleimenov [3] . The proof is based on punishment strategies technique. This technique permits to characterize the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs [3] , [4] .
The main result of this paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the sufficient conditions for a pair of continuous function to provide a Nash equilibrium. This result generalizes the method of the systems of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
Preliminaries
We consider the following doubly controlled systeṁ x = f (t, x, u, v), t ∈ [t 0 , ϑ 0 ], x ∈ R n , u ∈ P, v ∈ Q.
Here u and v are controls of the player I and the player II respectively. Payoffs are terminal. The player I wants to maximize σ 1 (x(ϑ 0 )), the player II wants to maximize σ 2 (x(ϑ 0 )). We assume that the sets P and Q are compacts, the function f , σ 1 and σ 2 are continuous, moreover f is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the phase variable, and satisfies the sublinear growth condition with respect to x. The use the control design suggested in [3] . This control design follows N.N. Krasovskii positional formalization. Feedback strategy of the Player I is a pair of function U = (u(t, x, ε), β 1 (ε)). Here u(t, x, ε) is a function of position (t, x) ∈ [t 0 , ϑ 0 ] × R n and precision parameter ε, β 1 (ε) is a continuous function of precision parameter. We suppose that β 1 (ε) → 0, ε → 0. Analogously, the feedback strategy of the Player II is a pair V = (v(t, x, ε), β 2 (ε)).
Let a position (t * , x * ) be chosen.
Step-by-step motion is defined in the following way. We suppose that the players choose precision parameters ε 1 and ε 2 respectively. Let the Player I choose the partition of the interval [t * , ϑ 0 ] ∆ 1 = {τ j } r j=0 of the fineness less than ε 1 . Suppose that the Player II chooses the partition ∆ 2 = {ξ k } ν k=1 of the fineness less than ε 2 . The solution x[·] of equation (1) with initial date x[t * ] = x * such that the control of the Player I is equal to u(τ j , x[τ j ], ε 1 ) on [τ j , τ j+1 ), and the control of the Player II is equal to
The set of all step-by-step motions from the position (t * , x * ) under strategies U and V and precision parameters ε 1 and ε 2 is denoted by X(t * , x * ; U, ε 1 ; V, ε 2 ). The step-by-step motions is called consistent if ε 1 = ε 2 .
A limit of step-by-motions
Denote by X(t * , x * ; U, V ) the set of constructive motions. By Arzela-Ascoli theorem the set of constructive motions is nonempty. If the limit is taken only by consistent step-by-step motions the limit is called consistent constructive motions. Denote the set of consistent constructive motions by X c (t * , x * ; U, V ). This set is nonempty also.
The following definition of Nash equilibrium is used.
The pair of strategies U N and V N is said to be Nash equilibrium solution at the position (t * , x * ), if for all strategies U and V the following inequalities hold:
The pair of payoff (J 1 , J 2 ) determined by a Nash solution is called a Nash equilibrium payoff of the game. In the typical case there are many Nash equilibriums with different payoffs. The set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs is called a Nash value of the game and is denoted by by N (t * , x * ). One can consider multivalued map taking (t * , x * ) to the N (t * , x * ).
The set N (t * , x * ) is nonempty under the Isaacs condition [3] , [2] . The proof is based on the punishment strategy technique. If the Isaacs condition is not fulfilled the Nash equilibrium solution exists in the class of mixed strategies or in the class of pair counterstrategy/strategy [3] .
Below we suppose the Isaacs condition holds:
Remark 1. If the Isaacs condition doesn't hold, one can consider the solution in the class of mixed strategies. For this purpose we consider doubly controlled systeṁ
Here µ is a generalized control of the Player I, ν is a generalized control of the Player II, rpm(P ), rpm(Q) are sets of regular probabilistic measures on P and Q respectively. We endow the sets rpm(P ) and rpm(Q) with * -weak topology. Obtained topology spaces are compacts. It is easy to show that the Isaacs condition is fulfilled for system (2). Further we will not mention the change from system (1) to system (2).
Consider the zero-sum differential game Γ 1 with dynamic determined by (1) and the payoff determined by σ 1 (x(ϑ 0 )). We assume that the Player I wants to maximize σ 1 (x(ϑ 0 )) the interest of the Player II is opposite. There exists the value of the game Γ 1 . Denote it by ω 1 . Analogously consider the zero-sum differential game with the dynamics (1) and the payoff σ 2 . We assume that the Player II wants to maximize σ 2 (x(ϑ 0 )) while the Player I want to minimize it. Denote the value of this game by ω 2 .
Main result
Consider the differential inclusioṅ
By Sol(t * , x * ) denote the set of solution of (3) with initial data x(t * ) = x * . Proposition 1. Let the multivalued map T : [t 0 , ϑ 0 ] × R n → P(R 2 ) satisfy the following conditions:
This proposition follows from [3, Theorem 1.4]. Further we limit our attention to closed multivalues maps. The map T :
Here Cl denotes the closure of graph:
Let I be a indexing set. Let multivalued maps
The multivalued map T * is closed has compact images and satisfies conditions (N1)-(N3). By T + denote the closure of pointwise union of all upper semicontinuous multivalued map
Further we formulate condition (N3) in the terms of viability theory and obtain the infinitesimal form of this condition.
Theorem 1 is proved in section 5. In order to obtain the infinitesimal form of condition (N3) we define a derivative of a multivalued map. By dist denote the following planar distance between the point (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ R 2 and the set A ⊂ R 2 :
Define the directional derivative of the multivalued map by the rule
× R n is equivalent to the following one:
Theorem 2 is proved in section 5.
Introduce the set
Remark 2. Condition (4) can be formulated in the following way:
The statement follows from the proof of theorem 2. Let us show a sufficient condition for the function (c 1 , c 2 ) : [t 0 , ϑ 0 ] × R n → R 2 to provide a Nash equilibrium. Denote
define a modulus derivative at the position (t, x) in the direction w ∈ R n by the rule
, for each i the function c i is upper viscosity solution of the equation
and for all (t,
Then for all (t, x) ∈ [t 0 , ϑ 0 ] × R n the pair of numbers (c 1 (t, x), c 2 (t, x)) is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the game.
Corollary 1 follows from the definition of modulus derivative and the property of upper solution of equation (5) [7] :
Let us show that the suggested method is a generalization of the method based on the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. This method provide a Nash solution in the class of continuous strategies [5] .
Suppose that the function (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) satisfies the following condition: for all positions (t,
Then the function (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) satisfies the conditions of corollary 1.
This proposition is proved in section 5.
If one can choose the pair (u n , v n ) for each position (t, x) ∈ [t 0 , ϑ 0 ] × R n and the pair of directions s 1 , s 2 ∈ R n uniquely, then the Hamiltonians H i are well defined by the rule
In this case condition (8) is equal to the following one: (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is a solution of the system
Example
Consider the nonzero-sum differential game with the dynamic
Payoffs are determined by the formulas σ 1 (x, y) −|x − y|, σ 2 (x, y) y. We recall that each player wants to maximize his payoff.
In order to determine the multivalued map N : [0, 1] × R 2 → P(R 2 ), we determine auxiliary multivalued maps
Obviously,
First we determine the map S 2 . The value function of the game Γ 2 is equal to ω 2 (t, x * , y * ) = y * + (1 − t). Also, c + 2 (t, x * , y * ) = y * + (1 − t). Consequently
Let us determine the set S 1 . Programmed iteration method [6] yields that
Now we compute the map N (t, x * , y * ). The linearity of right hand of (9) and the convexity of restrictions on control yield that any control can be substitute by the pair of constant controls (u, v) ∈ P × Q. We have that for all (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ S 1 (t, x * , y * ) × S 2 (t, x * , y * )
First we consider the case y * ≥ x * . Let (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ N (t, x * , y * ). There exists a mo-
. From condition (N2) we get that
The equality is achieved only if u = 1. Condition (N1) yields that the the following inclusion is fulfilled N (t, x * , y * ) ⊂ {(−|x * − y * |, y * + (1 − t))}.
Substituting value (1, 1) for w in formula for D H N (t, x * , y * ; (−|x * − y * |, y * + (1 − t)), w) we claim that for y * ≥ x * N (t, x * , y * ) = (−|x * − y * |, y * + (1 − t)) .
Now let y * < x * . We shall show that
Clearly, conditions (N1) and (N2) hold for this map. Let γ 0 be a maximal number of segment
. Let us prove that there exists a number δ > 0 with the property (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ N (t + δ, x * + δu, y * + δ)
for u = 1 − d. It is sufficient to prove that
Indeed, y * − x * + d(1 − t) ≥ y * − x * + δd for δ < (1 − t). Since d ≤ γ 0 , we obtain that
Actually, since γ 0 ≤ 2, the following inequality is fulfilled
Moreover y * − x * + δd + γ 0 (1 − t − δ) ≤ δd − γ 0 δ ≤ 0. Thus the condition
is valid also. It follows from (13) that
Since N (t, x * , y * ) coincide with the set S 1 (t, x * , y * ) × S 2 (t, x * , y * ) in this case, we claim that the set N (t, x * , y * ) is Nash value of the game at the position (t, x * , y * ). Let us compare the obtained result with the method based on system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations [5] . In considered case the system of equations is given by
Here the valuesû(t, x, y) andv(t, x, y) are determined by the following conditions
It follows from Proposition 2 that if a pair of functions (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is a solution of the system (14), then ϕ 2 (t, x, y) = y + (1 − t). Thus v * (t, x, y) = 1. Consequently, the system (14) reduces to the equation
By [7, Theorem 5.6] we obtain that the function
is a minimax solution of equation (15). Indeed if ϕ 1 is smooth at (t, x, y) then equation (15) is fulfilled in classical sense. On a planes {(t, x, y) : x = y}, {(t, x, y) : −x + y + 2(1 − t) = 0} we have that the Clarke subdifferential is the convex hull of two limit of partial derivatives of the function ϕ 1 . By well-known properties of subdifferentials and superdifferentail, the continuity and positive homogeneity of equation (15) we obtain that ϕ 1 satisfies conditions U4 and L4 of [7] . The function ϕ 1 is nonsmooth. Since the minimax solution is unique, and any classical solution is minimax, we claim that system (14) have no classical solution. One may obtain from the formulae for N (t, x, y) that (ϕ 1 (t, x, y), ϕ 2 (t, x, y)) ∈ N (t, x, y). Moreover, N (t, x, y) .
In other words, the value (ϕ 1 (t, x, y), ϕ 2 (t, x, y)) is the maximal Nash equilibrium payoff of the game at the position (t, x, y).
One can check that the pair of functions (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) satisfies the conditions of corollary 1. Simultaneity, there exists a family of function satisfying the condition of corollary 1. (5). By [7, condition U4] it suffices to show that for all (t, x, y)
Here D − denotes the subdifferential [7, (6.10) ]. The computing of subdifferentials gives that
Substituting the values of subdifferentials, we get that (16) is valid for i = 1, 2.
Also
Note that (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) = (c 2 1 , c 2 2 ).
Weak invariance of the set of values
In this section the statements formulated in section 3 are proved.
Proof of Theorem 1. If condition (N3) holds, then one can put θ = ϑ 0 . Now suppose that for all (t * , x * ), (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (t * , x * ) there exist θ ∈ [t * , ϑ 0 ] and a motion y(·) ∈ Sol(t * , x * ), such that the following condition is fulfilled
Let Θ be a set of moments θ satisfying condition (17) for some y(·) ∈ Sol(t * , x * ). Denote τ sup Θ. We have that τ ∈ Θ. Indeed, let a sequence {θ k } ∞ k=1 ⊂ Θ tend to τ . One can assume that θ k < θ k+1 ≤ τ . For every k condition (17) is valid under θ = θ k , y(·) = y k (·) ∈ Sol(t * , x * ). The compactness of bundle of motions yields that y k (·) → y * (·), k → ∞, here y * (·) is an element of Sol(t * , x * ). The closeness of the map T gives that (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (θ k , y * (θ k )). By the same argument we claim that (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (τ, y * (τ )). Denote x * = y * (τ ).
Let us show that τ = ϑ 0 . If τ < ϑ 0 , then there exist a motionŷ(·) ∈ Sol(τ, x * ) and a moment θ ′ > τ such that (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (t,ŷ(t)), t ∈ [τ, θ ′ ]. Consider a motioñ
By definition of θ ′ it follows that (17) is valid under θ = θ ′ , y(·) =ỹ(·). Thus θ ′ ∈ Θ, this contradicts with the choice of τ . Consequently, τ = ϑ 0 and condition (N3) holds.
Proof of theorem 2. Let us introduce a graph of map T
One can reformulate the condition of theorem 1 in the following way: the graph of T is weakly invariant under the differential inclusion
The condition of weak invariance of the multivalued map T under differential inclusion F is equivalent [7, 8] to the following condition
denote a section of G by t:
symbol d denote Euclidian distance between a point and a set. Following [7] , [8] put
Let us show that conditions (4) and (18) are equivalent. Condition (4) means that for every pair (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (t, x) the following condition holds:
The lower boundary by w in the formula
is attained for all (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (t, x). Indeed, let {w r } ∞ r=1 be a minimizing sequence. By the compactness of F(t, x) one can assume that w r → w * , r → ∞, w * ∈ F(t, x). Let us show that b inf
Indeed for every r ∈ N there exist a sequences {δ r,k } ∞ k=1 , {γ r,k } ∞ k=1 such that δ r,k , γ r,k → 0, k → ∞ and
Letk(r) be a number such that
Putδ r δ r,k(r) ,γ r γ r,k(r) + w r − w * . Note thatδ r , γ r → 0, r → ∞.
We have that inf
Further,
We have that in (20) right and left hands are equal. This means that condition (19) is valid. Thus, condition (4) is equivalent to the following one: for all (J 1 , J 2 ) ∈ T (t, x) there exists w ∈ F(t, x) such that lim inf
Now let us prove that this condition is equivalent to condition (18). First we assume that condition (18) is valid. This means that there exist sequences
One can reformulate the second condition as
Thus,
By the choice {ε k 1 }, {ε k 2 } we obtain that condition (21) holds. Now let condition (21) be fulfilled, prove that (18) 
be a minimizing sequence. By compactness of the sets T t + δ k , x + δ k (w + γ k ) for each k there exist ε k 1 and ε k 2 such that
It follows from (21) that ε k 1 , ε k . We have that
Consequently,
The convergence δ k , γ k , ε k 1 , ε k 2 → 0 as k → ∞ yields the equality   w 0 0   ∈ D t (grT )(t, x, J 1 , J 2 ).
Since F(t, x) = F × {(0, 0)}, we claim that (18) is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from (6) and the Isaacs condition that ∇ϕ 1 (t, x), f (t, x, u n , v n ) ≥ max u∈P min v∈Q ∇ϕ 1 (t, x), f (t, x, u, v) = H 1 (t, x, ∇ϕ 1 (t, x)).
Analogously, it follows from (7) and the Isaacs condition that ∇ϕ 2 (t, x), f (t, x, u n , v n ) ≥ max v∈Q min u∈P ∇ϕ 2 (t, x), f (t, x, u, v) = H 2 (t, x, ∇ϕ 2 (t, x)).
Therefore, using (8) we claim that ∂ϕ i (t, x) ∂t + H i (t, x, ∇ϕ i (t, x)) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2.
Since the function ϕ i is differentiable, its subdifferential at the position (t, x) is equal to {∂ϕ 1 (t, x)/∂t, ∇ϕ 1 (t, x)}. Consequently, the function ϕ 1 is the upper solution of equation (5) for i = 1 [7, Condition (U4) ]. Analogously, the function ϕ 2 is the upper solution of equation (5) for i = 2. Now let us show that d abs (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )(t, x; w) = 0 for w ∈ F(t, x). Put w = f (t, x, u n , v n ). Indeed, d abs (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )(t, x; w) = lim inf δ↓0, γ →0 |ϕ 1 (t + δ, x + δ(w + γ)) − ϕ 1 (t, x)| + |ϕ 2 (t + δ, x + δ(w + γ)) − ϕ 2 (t, x)| δ .
Let {δ k } ∞ k=1 ⊂ R, {γ k } ∞ k=1 ⊂ R n be a minimizing sequence. Then d abs (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )(t, x; w) = lim k→∞ |ϕ 1 (t + δ k , x + δ k (w + γ k )) − ϕ 1 (t, x)| + |ϕ 2 (t + δ k , x + δ(w + γ k )) − ϕ 2 (t, x)| δ k = lim
= ∂ϕ 1 (t, x) ∂t + ∇ϕ 1 (t, x), w + ∂ϕ 2 (t, x) ∂t + ∇ϕ 2 (t, x), w .
By choice of w = f (t, x, u n , v n ) and condition (8) we have that ∂ϕ 1 (t, x) ∂t + ∇ϕ 1 (t, x), w = ∂ϕ 2 (t, x) ∂t + ∇ϕ 2 (t, x), w = 0.
Thus d abs (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )(t, x; w) = 0.
